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CASE NOTES
Corporations—Sale of Stock—Condition for the Transfer of Director-
ship Control.—Essex University Corp. v. Yates.1—The defendant, Yates,
was president of the board of directors of Republic Pictures Corporation, a
New York corporation having 2,004,190 shares of common stock outstanding.
On August 28, 1957 the defendant entered into a contract with Joseph
Harris, the president of Essex Universal Corporation, whereby Essex
agreed to buy and Yates to sell 566,223 shares, or 28.3 per cent of the
Republic stock. The price was eight dollars a share, approximately two
dollars above the then market price. A condition was attached to the con-
tract whereby the seller would obtain the agreement of the majority of the
directors of Republic to a process of seriatim resignation, each in turn being
replaced by the Essex nominee. At the agreed date of performance the
defendant (seller) refused to perform. Essex then brought an action for
breach of contract in the New York Supreme Court, and it was removed to
the United States District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship.
The District Court rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the
ground that the condition for the transfer of directorship control was in-
valid as against public policy. On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, HELD: The condition for transfer of
directors was not, under New York law, per se invalid as against public
policy.
The court was faced with the difficult question of determining, not
what the law of New York should be, but what it is. The court recognized
the fact that there is hardly enough New York authority for an informed
prediction of what the New York Court of Appeals would decide on the
facts here presented. In resolving this question the court refers initially to
the early New York Court of Appeals decision of Barnes v. Browne which
held that the owner of a majority interest may properly, in connection with a
sale of his shares agree with the buyer to procure the resignation of directors
to facilitate or accelerate the transfer of control by the buyer. Judge Earl
stated:
[The seller] had the right to sell out all his stock and interest
in the corporation . • . and when he ceased to have any interest in
the corporation, it was certainly legitimate and right that he should
cease to control it. . . It was simply the mode of transferring the
control of the corporation to those who by the policy of the law
ought to have it, and I am unable to see how any policy of the law
was violated, or in what way, upon the evidence, any wrong was
thereby done to anyone.
While in the Barnes case no term of the contract3 of sale required the
seller to effectuate the immediate replacement of directors, as did the con-
tract in the present case, the Barnes court stated, "I shall assume that it
was the understanding and a part of the scheme that he should do so." 4
1 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
2 go N.Y. 527 (1880).
a Id. at 537.
4 Id. at 536.
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As the agreement in Barnes was justified by the rationale that the transfer of
the directorships was inevitable in a transfer of a majority of the stock
and that the parties thus could facilitate the inevitable, the court's reliance
on this case implies that today, in a large public issue corporation, a holding
of 28.3 per cent of stock would be tantamount to majority control. Each of
the three justices wrote a separate opinion. Judge Lombard, in his opinion,
applied a "practical-certainty" test. He said that if, at the trial level, it
could be found that a certain percentage of shares would in fact amount
to control then the condition in the contract would be valid. Judge Clark
however felt that twenty-eight per cent equals control and this should not
be an issue at the trial level. Judge Friendly, while disagreeing with the
rationale of Lombard and Clark, stated that, "although [Barnes] dealt
with the sale of a majority interest, I am unable to find any real indication
that the doctrine there announced has been thus limited . . . to indicate that
New York would not apply the [Barnes] doctrine to a case where a stock-
holder conditioned a sale on his causing the resignation of a majority of the
directors and the election of the purchaser's nominees." 5
Although it may be true that the New York courts have not specifically
overruled Barnes v. Brown, there are strong inferences that the 1880 doc-
trine is outmoded due to the evolution of corporate law and theory.
The early conventional approach of the Barnes court and of the deci-
sions relying thereon(' was to regard controlling shares as an ordinary asset
which corporate managers may buy and sell with the same freedom which the
law permits with respect to other kinds of property.? This approach is
predicated upon the notion that the corporation—the collective body of
shareholders—is a separate legal entity, an artificial personality, to whom
an officer, a director or a controlling shareholder owes his sole duty. It
followed as a necessary corollary that the controlling shareholder was not
a fiduciary of and owed no duty to the outside shareholders as individuals
when he sold his stock to strangers.8 Therefore, (under this conventional
approach) the controlling shareholder could sell to any person, at any time
and at any price. 9
An examination of the recent New York cases will disclose a current
trend in the law to prevent abuse of power on the sale of control. These
cases show that the conventional approach of the Barnes court, which
was used as authority by the present court in reaching its decision, has
not only been generally discredited, but has been by implication discarded.
The Supreme Court of New York, in the case of Ballantine v. Ferretti,
5 305 F.2d at 582.
Roosevelt v. Hamblin, 199 Mass. 127, 85 N.E. 98 (1908); San Remo Copper
Mining Co. v. Moneuse, 149 App. Div. 26, 133 N.Y. Supp. 509 (1912).
7 Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1956); Hill, The
Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986 (1957).
8 Jennings, supra note 7, at 6.
Roosevelt v. Hamblin, supra note 6; Levy v. Feinberg, 29 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup.
Ct. 1941), rev'd sub nom., Levy v. Armstrong Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38
N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942) ; Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc, 621, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221 (Sup. Ct.
1931). But see Fremont v. Stone, 42 Barb. 169 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864), where the
principle is qualified to the extent that the directorate may not be turned over to
persons who there is reason to believe will loot the corporation.
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said in effect: Though a corporation may, under certain circumstances, pay or
permit [a] third party to pay some consideration to some officers and
directors to induce them to resign, sale of control by those standing in [a]
fiduciary relation to the corporation may be wrongful even though [the]
corporation does not complain.10
 In the 1941 case of Gerdes v. Reynolds,"
which Judge Lombard distinguished in that it "did no more than hold con-
trolling shareholders who sold out to persons whose intentions they had
reason to suspect to an accounting, after the fact," 12 the court stated,
in seeming contradiction to Judge Lombard's interpretation, that
Officers and directors always and necessarily stand in a fiduciary
relation to the corporation and to its stockholders. . . . They un-
doubtedly may free themselves of that fiduciary relationship by
ceasing to be officers and directors, but their right to resign,
although sometimes stated with seeming absoluteness is qualified
by their fiduciary obligation to others. . . Neither can they ac-
cept pay in any form or guise, direct or devious, for their own
resignation or for the election for others in their place. . . . [S]uch
a contract cannot be made a vehicle for a violation of any fiduciary
cluty.la
In the Gerdes case, the liability of the four directors who sold their stock,
resigned and placed the buyer's candidates in control of the directorship
was asserted against them on two grounds. First, "that the sale of stock,
accompanied by their resignations and the election of their successors
nominated by the purchaser, was itself an illegal transaction because in
violation of fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and the holders of its
debentures and its preferred stock and its minority common stockholders.""
(Emphasis supplied.) The second reason for finding liability (i.e., holding,
controlling shareholders who sold out to persons whose intentions they had
reason to suspect to an accounting, after the fact) was the sole reason
stated by Judge Lombard upon which he based his interpretation of the case.
Even granting Judge Lombard's interpretation, there exists at the minimum
a very strong inference that such a sale of directorship is illegal as a
breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation and to the other stockholders.
The modern viewpoint, consistent with these recent New York cases,
indicates that, when majority stockholders have in fact assumed the manage-
ment of the corporation, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the minority. 15
While they may resign, this right is qualified by their fiduciary obligation
10 28 N.Y.S.2d 668, 680 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
11 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
" 305 F.2d at 577.
13 Gerdes v. Reynolds, supra note 11, at 651-52.
14 Id. at 649.
15 Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 491 (1919); B]austein v. Pan Am.
Petroleum & Transp. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 665, 690, 21 N.Y.S.2d 651, 711, 733 (1940);
Cleary v. Higley, 154 Misc. 158, 168-69, 277 N.Y. Supp. 63, 76, afrd, 246 App. Div.
698, 284 N.Y. Supp. 989 (1934); Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. N.Y. & No. R.R. Co.,
150 N.Y. 410, 430-31, 44 N.E. 1043, 1048-49 (1896); Hornstein, Corporation Law &
Practice § 366 (1959); Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation & Private Property
243 (1932).
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to others." Recent cases hold that a seller, who is a director and a dom-
inant stockholder stands in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and
to the minority stockholders as beneficiaries thereof. 17 The cases are imposing
a strictly fiduciary capacity on the directors, in effect making their office
a trust."
In the fairly recent case of Benson v. Braun the New York Supreme
Court stated that "It appears similarly probable that the sellers expected or
assumed that their resignations would be requested. Such expectations or
assumptions cannot be equated with the bartering of corporate offices
which the law forbids."'
In recent commentary on the subject, the corporate asset theory,
first advanced by Berle, has been emphasized. 2° The claim is "that any
premium paid for a majority block of stock is paid by the purchaser
because the shares carry `control'; the purchaser is 'buying power and not
stock ....' [Thus] 'the power going with the control is an asset which belongs
only to the corporation....' "21
While the 1880 case of Barnes v. Brown was a Court of Appeals decision
and the three New York cases mentioned above 22 were lower court decisions,
it seems apparently clear that, while Barnes has not been overruled, the
theory upon which its decision was based has passed from the prevailing
concept of corporate law. 23 The directors are placed in office by the stock-
16
 O'Neil v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 430, 171 N.E. 694, 696 (1930);
Lattin, The Law of Corporations § 13 (1959); Jennings, supra note 7, at 9.
17 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S.
483 (1919).
18
 Perlman v, Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
Hill v. Nisbet, 100 Ind. 341, 353 (1885); Stratis v. Anderson, 254 Mass. 536, 150 N.E.
832 (1926).
19 8 Misc. 2d 67, 71, 155 N.Y.S.2d 622, 627 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
29
 Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation & Private Property 244 (1932).
21 Jennings, supra note 7, at 9.
22 Supra notes 10, 11 & 19.
23 The federal courts, in deciding a question of state law, are not necessarily bound
by an early decision of the state's highest court where subsequent inferior state court
decisions have consistently refused to be so bound. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.
of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1955), faced in a diversity case with a question apparently
settled by a 1910 decision of the state's highest court, the Court conformed to the
early decision. However, in a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested
that a federal court might declare that the Vermont court if faced with the question
at this time might reach a conclusion contrary to the 1910 decision. He argued quite
forcefully that "the 1910 decision should not foreclose consideration by the federal
distiict court of the question, and that the Court should attempt to decide what the
Vermont court would do if faced with the question at this time." 350 U.S. at 211.
Cf. Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906, 908 (1st Cir. 1957).
In the present case the court seemed unwilling to go beyond the 1880 decision of
the New York Court of Appeals and the theory upon which it was based. Judge
Friendly notes the solution to such a problem adopted in Florida, where the Supreme
Court of Florida may answer questions of state law certified to it by the federal
appellate courts. Fla. Rev. Stat. § 25.031 (1959); Rule 4.61 of the Supreme Court of
Florida. In the absence of such an available procedure, the abstention of federal courts
on questions of state law is limited to areas of sovereign prerogative, Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), and uninterpreted state statutes,
the constitutionality of which is doubtful, Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352
U.S. 220 (1957).
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holders and a duty—a fiduciary relationship—flows down not only to
the controlling shareholders but to all the stockholders. A sale of the
directorships is a sale of a corporate asset and, considered as a breach of the
fiduciary duty of these sellers, as directors, should not be countenanced by
the law.
The trend of law today seems to be toward regarding management
control as a corporate asset in which all shareholders have an equitable
interest and in which they are entitled to share. On this basis the Barnes
doctrine and the decision in the present case represent an outmoded view."
Judge Friendly's opinion in the present case is indicative of the modern
approach to the director's increased fiduciary obligations:
. . . developments over the past decades seem to me to show that
such a clause violates basic principles of corporate democracy. . .
A mass seriatim resignation directed by a selling stockholder, and
the filling of vacancies by his henchmen at the dictation of a pur-
chaser and without any consideration of the character of the
latter's nominees, are beyond what the stockholders contemplated
or should have been expected to contemplate. . . . A special meet-
ing of stockholders to replace a board may always be called, and
there could be no objection to making the closing of a purchase
contingent on the results of such an election. 25
THOMAS J. MUNDY, JR.
Corporations—Stockholder's Rights—Inspection of the Corporate Stock
Ledger.—Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. State of Del. ex rel. Porterie.'—
Petitioner, owner of record of one hundred shares of TWA stock, was refused
permission by TWA to inspect its stock ledger. Its refusal was predicated
on the contention that the petitioner was acting solely in behalf of Howard
Hughes' interests which were being sued by TWA in another jurisdiction
in connection with certain loans made to TWA. The airline further contended
that the inspection was sought for the purpose of soliciting stockholder
support for a resolution instigated by Hughes via the petitioner, recom-
mending that it assist Hughes in prosecuting claims against certain !ending
institutions. Such action by TWA's management would result in an aban-
donment of its claims against Hughes, which TWA asserts would be inimical
to the corporation. The Superior Court of Delaware granted a writ of
mandamus permitting a qualified inspection of TWA's stock ledger. On
24 Berle, "Control" In Corporate Law, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1212, 1217 (1958):
A third point of contact is the practically universal prohibition of contracts
by directors to resign, tciting Gerdes case] . . . . The vice therefore of a
director's contract to resign . . . at bottom rests not on the fact that such action
is based on personal motives but on the simple fact that the control function
is being abused. The thrust is quite simply, that directorships may not be
bought and sold.
25 305 F.2d at 581.
I — Del. —, 183 A.2d 174 (1962).
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